Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem
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Peer-reviewed
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Abstract
It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view (A) is irrational and (B) manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.
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Erkenntnis
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0165-0106
1572-8420
1572-8420
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80
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Springer Nature
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Australian National University (Visiting Fellowship)