Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games
Levine, David K
International Journal of Game Theory
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Block, J., & Levine, D. K. (2015). Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games. International Journal of Game Theory https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2
We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting.
repeated game, folk theorem, self-referential game, approximate equilibrium
Juan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute, and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute for financial support.
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/260376