Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games
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Publication Date
2015-09-01Journal Title
International Journal of Game Theory
ISSN
0020-7276
Publisher
Springer
Language
English
Type
Article
This Version
AM
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Block, J., & Levine, D. K. (2015). Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games. International Journal of Game Theory https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2
Abstract
We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's
intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem
for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction
of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's
intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting.
Keywords
repeated game, folk theorem, self-referential game, approximate equilibrium
Sponsorship
Juan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute,
and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute
for financial support.
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/260376
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