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dc.contributor.authorBlock, Juanen
dc.contributor.authorLevine, David Ken
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-26T11:15:58Z
dc.date.available2016-09-26T11:15:58Z
dc.date.issued2015-09-01en
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/260376
dc.description.abstractWe examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting.
dc.description.sponsorshipJuan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute, and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute for financial support.
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.subjectrepeated gameen
dc.subjectfolk theoremen
dc.subjectself-referential gameen
dc.subjectapproximate equilibriumen
dc.titleCodes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Gamesen
dc.typeArticle
dc.description.versionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2.en
prism.publicationDate2015en
prism.publicationNameInternational Journal of Game Theoryen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.4607
dcterms.dateAccepted2015-08-17en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2en
rioxxterms.versionAMen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2015-09-01en
dc.contributor.orcidBlock, Juan [0000-0002-0272-3427]
dc.identifier.eissn1432-1270
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen


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