This article suggests that courts regulate constitutional rights. As such, some may attribute to its author little in the way of revolutionary legal scholarship. “Do Courts regulate?” appears to the uninitiated to be a rhetorical question because when courts make decisions, and decisions are regulations, then courts must be regulators. The syllogistic answer to the above question is superficially yes: courts are regulators and “so what”?2 However, therein lies an overlooked consideration: although courts do regulate, what is meant by regulation in the judicial context and where does that power originate? What exactly do courts regulate? Is this a legitimate exercise, or a mislabeling of judicial activism? Courts will regulate at certain times; not all decisions are regulations; some decisions are in a constitutional or rights class and are further identifiable as a “lis of distinction”4 in their regulatory import. A judicial regulatory mechanism exists which can further rebut the rhetorical sentiment – “do courts regulate”? This article considers the judiciary as a regulatory mechanism and acknowledges the existence of an unsubstantiated norm that common law courts, just as other classical regulators, regulate directly. The judiciary regulates specifically in the rights and constitutional arena wider than the lis in particular inter se disputes. I turn to four illustrations, comparative jurisprudence, and the descriptive reasoning necessary to advance a new theory in regulatory law.