Rational Disinhibition and Externalities in Prevention
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Toxvaerd, Flavio https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1979-9695
Abstract
This article studies a model of disease propagation in which rational and forward‐looking individuals can control their exposure to infection by engaging in costly preventive behavior. Equilibrium outcomes under decentralized decision making are characterized and contrasted to the outcomes chosen by a social planner. In general, individuals overexpose themselves to infection, leading to suboptimally high disease prevalence. The model is applied to study the welfare effects of preexposure prophylaxis, which reduces transmission between serodiscordant couples and causes disinhibition. It is shown that a decrease in the induced infection risks increases disease prevalence and can lead to decreases in overall welfare.
Description
Keywords
38 Economics, 3803 Economic Theory, Clinical Research, Infectious Diseases, Behavioral and Social Science, Prevention, 3 Good Health and Well Being
Journal Title
International Economic Review
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0020-6598
1468-2354
1468-2354
Volume Title
60
Publisher
Wiley