Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities
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Peer-reviewed
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Abstract
jats:pWhy do well‐functioning psychological systems sometimes give rise to absurd beliefs that are radically misaligned with reality? Drawing on signalling theory, I develop and explore the hypothesis that groups often embrace beliefs that are viewed as absurd by outsiders as a means of signalling ingroup commitment. I clarify the game‐theoretic and psychological underpinnings of this hypothesis, I contrast it with similar proposals about the signalling functions of beliefs, and I motivate several psychological and sociological predictions that could be used to distinguish it from alternative explanations of irrational group beliefs.</jats:p>
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Funder: This work was supported by an Early Career Research Fellowship from Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge.
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1468-0017