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Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities

Published version
Peer-reviewed

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Abstract

jats:pWhy do well‐functioning psychological systems sometimes give rise to absurd beliefs that are radically misaligned with reality? Drawing on signalling theory, I develop and explore the hypothesis that groups often embrace beliefs that are viewed as absurd by outsiders as a means of signalling ingroup commitment. I clarify the game‐theoretic and psychological underpinnings of this hypothesis, I contrast it with similar proposals about the signalling functions of beliefs, and I motivate several psychological and sociological predictions that could be used to distinguish it from alternative explanations of irrational group beliefs.</jats:p>

Description

Funder: This work was supported by an Early Career Research Fellowship from Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge.

Keywords

absurd belief, irrationality, motivated reasoning, self-deception, signalling, socially adaptive belief

Journal Title

Mind and Language

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0268-1064
1468-0017

Volume Title

Publisher

Wiley