Introducing Identity

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The best-known syntactic account of the logical constants is <jats:italic>inferentialism</jats:italic> . Following Wittgenstein’s thought that meaning is use, inferentialists argue that meanings of expressions are given by introduction and elimination rules. This is especially plausible for the logical constants, where standard presentations divide inference rules in just this way. But not just any rules will do, as we’ve learnt from Prior’s famous example of <jats:italic>tonk</jats:italic>, and the usual extra constraint is <jats:italic>harmony</jats:italic>. Where does this leave identity? It’s usually taken as a logical constant but it doesn’t seem harmonious: standardly, the introduction rule (reflexivity) only concerns a subset of the formulas canvassed by the elimination rule (Leibniz’s law). In response, Read [5, 8] and Klev [3] amend the standard approach. We argue that both attempts fail, in part because of a misconception regarding inferentialism and identity that we aim to identify and clear up.</jats:p>